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{1} On February 28, 2000, Jay Cohen, co-owner of an Antiguan-based Internet casino called World Sports
Exchange, was convicted by a U.S. District Court jury in Manhattan of breaching the Wire Communications
Act of 1961[1] (hereinafter Wire Act).[2] A New York federal judge subsequently fined Cohen $5,000 and
sentenced him to serve a twenty-one month jail term.[3] A few days prior to his conviction, Cohen's lawyer
stated that "Jay strongly believes that he did not commit a crime, that he ran [World Sports Exchange] in a
completely legitimate manner."[4]
{2} Cohen's belief in the legitimacy of his licensed operation is one shared by a number of licensed Internet
gaming operators. Commenting on Cohen's conviction, David Ohlson, Special Projects Manager for
Lasseter's Online, Australia's first licensed Internet casino, stated that he was "not unduly worried" about the
court's decision even though Lasseter's Online transacts with gamblers in the U.S.[5] Similarly, giving
evidence before Australia's Senate Select Committee on Information Technologies on October 1, 1999, James
Colquhoun, Chairman of Canbet Pty Ltd, an Internet sports wagering business licensed under the laws of the
Australian Capital Territory, expressed his view that "[t]he offer [of a wager] in the U.S. is a perfectly legal
offer and the acceptance of that offer by Canbet under its license in the ACT [Australian Capital Territory] is
perfectly legal and therefore both ends of the contract are legal." [6]
{3} This paper will consider the circumstances in which an Internet casino that is operating under a valid
offshore license and accepts bets from people residing in the U.S. may contravene U.S. anti-gambling laws.
[7] In particular, it will consider the operation of the Wire Act [8] and the proposed Internet Gambling
Prohibition Act of 1999.[9] It will conclude that U.S. courts are likely to have jurisdiction to try actions for
breach of anti-gambling laws against offshore operators of licensed Internet casinos that transact with U.S.
residents, but will have difficulty enforcing those laws against those operators.
{4} This paper will first contrast the regulatory environment for Internet casinos in Australia and the U.S.
Australia provides an interesting counterpoint to the U.S. regulatory regime because of the markedly different
approach that it adopts to Internet gaming and because, unlike some countries that currently license Internet
gaming operators, it is difficult to criticize the legitimacy or sophistication of its licensing regime.
{5} Secondly, this paper will consider whether U.S. courts will be competent to hear actions for breach of
anti-gaming laws against offshore Internet casinos; that is, whether those courts will be able to assert the
requisite "subject matter jurisdiction" over those casinos.
{6} Thirdly, this paper will consider the jurisdictional reach of U.S. anti-gaming laws over licensed operators
of offshore Internet casinos; that is, whether the necessary element of "personal jurisdiction" will be present. 
{7} Finally, this paper will address the issue of whether U.S. anti-gambling laws will be enforceable against
operators of licensed offshore Internet casinos.
II. AUSTRALIAN AND U.S. REGULATORY REGIMES
A. Australian Regulatory Regime
{8} Historically, Australian gaming regulation has been the province of the various Australian State and
Territory Governments because the Commonwealth Constitution does not give the Commonwealth power in
respect to gaming. The size and long history of gaming in Australia have allowed each State and Territory to
develop significant regulatory regimes and a "high level of expertise across a range of areas, including
economic and social policy."[10]
{9} The existence of a well-established regime for regulation of traditional forms of gambling facilitated
Australia's rapid and robust response to the development of Internet gaming. In May 1997, gaming ministers
representing each Australian State and Territory released a draft model for regulating Internet gambling.[11]
Subsequent to the release of that model, five of Australia's eight States and Territories, beginning with
Queensland, whose Interactive Gambling (Player Protection) Act of 1998 commenced operation on October
1, 1998, have enacted comprehensive legislation regulating Internet gaming. 
The Australian Internet gaming industry can be characterized as being subject to stringent regulation by
sophisticated and experienced regulatory bodies. That regulation focuses on minimizing harm to problem
gamblers, and on ensuring that the industry operates within the bounds of Australian laws which apply to
traditional casinos. Accordingly, "the companies are solvent, the games are fair, and the winners can claim
their loot."[12]
{10} The Commonwealth Government has, however, expressed "grave concerns about the potential for
online gambling to exacerbate already high levels of problem gamblers in Australia."[13] Accordingly, on
August 17, 2000, in reliance on its power to legislate with respect to "postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and
other like services,"[14] the Commonwealth Government introduced the Interactive Gambling (Moratorium)
Bill 2000 (Cth). The intention of the Bill was to "pause the development of the Australian-based interactive
gambling industry while an investigation into the feasibility and consequences of banning interactive
gambling is conducted."[15] After intense political lobbying, the Bill finally passed the House of
Representatives on December 7, 2000. By that time more than half of the moratorium period had already
elapsed. Despite the temporary cessation of licensing as a result of the passage of the Bill, the Australian
Internet gaming industry continues to flourish.[16]
B. U.S. Regulatory Regime
{11} In contrast to the approach adopted in Australia, U.S. legislators have, almost without exception,
advocated prohibiting Internet gambling. Joseph Kelly notes that, during the course of the Senate debate over
the introduction of the IGPA, "not one senator suggested regulating, rather than prohibiting Internet
gambling."[17] This strict approach is consistent with the approach historically taken to regulation of
traditional forms of gambling. 
{12} Numerous U.S. statutes potentially prohibit, either directly or indirectly, Internet gambling. The U.S.
Department of Justice has claimed that Internet gambling is illegal under at least four federal statutes.[18] To
name a few, the Interstate Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia Act,[19] Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act[20] and the Interstate and Foreign Travel or Transportation in Aid of Racketeering
Enterprises Act,[21] may all proscribe some aspect of the activities of an Internet casino.
{13} The Wire Act is the most important legislative prohibition on Internet gaming, however, and it is this
Act that regulators have primarily relied on to obtain the convictions of Internet gaming operators. Similarly,
a number of Bills which, directly or indirectly, prevent Internet gambling are currently before the U.S.
Congress, but the most significant, and the one closest to enactment, is the IGPA.
(i) The Wire Act
{14} The Wire Act potentially prohibits Internet gaming operators from using the Internet for gaming. It
provides, in relevant part, that:
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire
communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers
or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest . . . shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.[22]
The proscribed conduct is, therefore, the use of a wire communication facility to facilitate betting by a person
operating a gaming business. A "wire communication facility" is defined as a system that is used to transmit
writings, pictures and sounds "by aid of wire, cable or other like connection between the points of origin and
reception of such transmission."[23]
{15} Two significant issues arise in relation to the application of the Wire Act to Internet gaming operators.
First, it is arguable that the Wire Act only applies to betting or wagering on sporting events or sporting
contests and, therefore, is inapplicable to online casino games. No reported cases have directly addressed the
issue of whether the Wire Act relates to non-sport related gambling.[24] In his Congressional testimony in
relation to the IGPA, the Deputy Assistant to the Attorney General, Kevin Di Gregory, identified this issue as
one of the key problems with the Wire Act and urged that the Wire Act be amended to eliminate any doubt
about whether it only applies to bets or wagers on sporting events or contests.[25]
{16} In one view, the word "sporting" is used as an adjective to qualify both the words "event" and "contest,"
and the Wire Act is, therefore, confined to sporting events and sporting contests. Olson argues that this view
accords with "the plain meaning of the statute."[26] Alternatively, "sporting event" and "contest" could be
viewed as two separate references. If this is the case, the Wire Act would apply to online games offered by
Internet casinos.
{17} The legislative history of the Wire Act provides some assistance. For instance, Congressional references
to the Wire Act at the time of its enactment focus specifically on sporting-related gambling activity.[27]
Moreover, Congress was aware of other forms of gaming, including, for example, the number's racket, which
utilized telephone lines. Cabot argues that, because Congress was aware of those other forms of gambling and
did not expressly address them, it must not have intended that the Wire Act be interpreted broadly to apply to
non-sport related gambling.[28] In contrast, Bruce P. Keller argues that, because Congress was aware of other
forms of gambling, the Wire Act should be interpreted broadly as it would be unlikely that Congress would
intend to carve out those other forms of telephone-based gambling.[29]
{18} Proponents of Cabot's view submit that it is to be preferred because it does not require imputing an
intention to Congress on the weak ground that it would have been obvious to include something; therefore,
Congress must have intended to include it. Nevertheless, the uncertainty in this regard somewhat undermines
the potential to use the Wire Act to prosecute Internet casinos.
{19} The second interpretive issue in relation to the application of the Wire Act to Internet casinos is whether
the definition of "wire communication facility" is broad enough to cover all communications over the
Internet. Again, Di Gregory, in his testimony on the IGPA before Congress, identified this as a significant
issue requiring clarification by amendment to ensure that even wireless Internet communications are covered
by the Wire Act.[30]
{20} Clearly, those Internet communications which are facilitated by modem connections to copper wires
will be covered by the Wire Act. Radio, satellite, microwave and other wireless means of transmission,
however, may not be covered. An Internet gaming system which relies on a wire-free communication system,
for example by utilizing Wireless Application Protocol or General Packet Radio Service technology, appears,
on the face of it, to fall outside the ambit of the Wire Act.
{21} A defendant who utilizes a wireless means of communication, and relies on that as a defense to an
action for breach of the Wire Act, however, will have a difficult argument to mount. First, the Wire Act does
not require that the entire communication be conducted over wires or cables. Even if a small portion of the
communication utilizes wires or cables, the transmission will fall within the scope of the Wire Act. Cabot
argues that the very operation of the Internet backbone, which underlies all Internet communications, may
constitute a "wire communication facility" under the Wire Act.[31]
{22} Second, the reference in the Wire Act to "other like connection" could be interpreted as indicating that
wireless forms of transmission, which utilize different media so as to perform the same function, are
sufficiently similar to wire or cable connections to fall within the operation of the Wire Act. The argument
supporting this view indicates that Congress would have intended the Wire Act to apply to new forms of
communication as they developed.[32]
{23} Despite the divergent views of commentators, the official position as expressed by the Justice
Department and several state attorneys general is to treat the Wire Act as applying broadly and covering all
forms of Internet gaming.[33] Accordingly, the uncertainty in the application of the Wire Act is unlikely to
dissuade prosecutors from employing it to bring actions against Internet casinos.
(ii) The Internet Gambling Prohibition Act
{24} The IGPA, first introduced into the Senate in 1995, passed the Senate unanimously on November 19,
1999. On July 17, 2000, however, the House version of the IGPA failed to achieve the two-thirds majority
vote required for it to become law. Although it was anticipated that the House version would come up for
another vote in September[34], at the time of writing the September Congressional session had concluded
without any further action. At that time, it was unclear when the House would next consider the IGPA or what
support it would receive within the newly elected Bush government.
{25} If and when it becomes law, the IGPA will add a new Section 1085 to Title 18 of the United States
Code. The new section will make it unlawful for any person engaged in a gambling business to knowingly
use the Internet to place, receive, or otherwise make a bet or wager, or to send, receive, or invite information
assisting in the placing of a bet or wager.[35] The Bill imposes a penalty of up to four years imprisonment,
fines of up to $20,000 or both.[36] Further, the Bill gives a court the power to issue a permanent injunction
against a person who violates the prohibition, preventing them from engaging in further betting activity.[37]
Similarly, the Bill allows regulators to seek injunctions preventing Internet Service Providers from hosting a
gambling website.[38]
{26} The IGPA contains a number of exceptions. It does not apply to state lotteries, parimutuel betting on
certain types of computer networks, horse and dog racing, fantasy sports leagues and certain types of Indian
gaming.[39]
{27} These exceptions have led some anti-Internet gaming activists to condemn the IGPA. Conservative,
anti-gambling Republican Chris Cannon, for example, has commented that the IGPA "should be called the
Internet Gambling Preservation Act instead."[40] Similarly, Di Gregory notes that, ironically, the IGPA "will
allow gambling online that currently is not allowed in the physical world."[41]
{28} Both the Wire Act and the IGPA, although limited in some respects, have the potential to be used to
prosecute offshore Internet casinos. The next question is whether United States courts will have jurisdiction
to hear actions brought under those legislative provisions against licensed offshore Internet casinos.
III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
{29} For a United States court to exercise jurisdiction over an offshore Internet casino, the court must be
satisfied that it has both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.[42] Subject matter jurisdiction
refers to the competency of the court to adjudicate the matter before it.
{30} This section will first consider instances where an Internet gambling transaction with a United States'
resident takes place. If the transaction takes place within the country's borders, United States courts will have
subject matter jurisdiction. Second, this section will consider whether, if the transaction takes place outside
the United States, the relevant anti-gaming laws apply extraterritorially.
A. Locus of Activity
{31} United States courts have not yet established the criteria for determining where an offense committed
"in cyberspace" actually occurs.[43] The question is significant because it presents a critical policy choice
between the rights of consumers of Internet content and the rights of providers of Internet content.[44]
{32} Jack Goldsmith has correctly asserted that Internet transactions "involve people in real space in one
territorial jurisdiction transacting with people in real space in another territorial jurisdiction in a way that
sometimes causes real-world harms."[45] Elements of an Internet gambling transaction are likely to occur
across a number of jurisdictions, however, and identification of a specific jurisdiction in which the act of
infringement actually occurs must, to some extent, be artificial.
{33} An Australian Internet casino licensed under the laws of the State of Queensland, for example, is likely
to have a server located in the state in which the information relating to the transaction is processed. The
casino's website may be hosted in another Australian state or in another country. Information passing between
the casino and a gambler in the United States is likely to pass through servers in a number of jurisdictions
before reaching the Internet Service Provider of a gambler in the United States. That gambler's Internet
Service Provider may be located in a national or state jurisdiction distinct from the one in which the gambler
who transacts with the casino is located.
{34} In gaming cases, United States' courts have tended to identify the place of infringement as the place of
downloading. In Vacco v. World Interactive Gaming,[46] for example, the court rejected World Interactive
Gaming's argument that it did not violate New York law because the gambling over its website occurred in
Antigua, where the computer servers were located. The court, focusing on the gamblers rather than the
casino, held that "[t]he acts of entering the bet and transmitting the information from New York via the
Internet [were] adequate to constitute gambling activity within New York state."[47] Clearly, such an
approach favors the interests of gaming regulators.
{35} Furthermore, in Vacco the court was explicit about the policy considerations underlying its findings. The
court asserted that "[a] computer server cannot be permitted to function as a shield against liability."[48] The
court's view echoes the view of enforcement agencies, as expressed by United States Attorney General, Janet
Reno, that "the Internet is not an electronic sanctuary for illegal betting."[49]
{36} At least one case, however, has adopted the contrary approach. In U.S. v. Truesdale[50] the court
considered an action for, among other things, illegal gambling in violation of Section 1995 of Title 18 of the
United States Code. The case involved defendants who operated an Internet sports betting site called World
Sports Book from offices in the Dominican Republic and Jamaica. The court, focusing on the actions of the
casino, stated that "it is irrational to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that after having gone through the
effort of fully equipping, staffing and widely advertising the Caribbean offices, the appellants, nevertheless,
illegally accepted bets in the United States."[51] Kelly notes that the result may have been different if the
defendants had been charged with a violation of the Wire Act.[52] Nevertheless, Truesdale indicates that
there may be an argument that, where an offshore Internet gaming operation transacts with a United States'
resident, the transaction does not occur within the United States.
{37} If United States courts take the view, of the Truesdale court, that the place at which the proscribed
activity takes place is the server of the offshore Internet casino, they will have to apply the relevant anti-
gaming laws extraterritorially. Accordingly, a court will need to determine whether such extraterritorial
application is congressionally mandated and complies with the "effects test."[53] The legality of the activity
will be irrelevant to this inquiry.
B. Power to Legislate Extraterritorially
{38} It is well established that the United States Congress has the power to enact laws that operate
extraterritorially.[54] The Commerce Clause is the basis of that power. It authorizes Congress "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."[55]
{39} Although a superior Federal court is yet to rule on the matter, it is likely that the extraterritorial power
of Congress extends to the regulation of Internet gaming. In Champion v. Ames, [56] the Supreme Court
established that the Commerce Clause gives Congress power to legislate with regard to illegal gambling
generally between the United States and a foreign location. Furthermore, the recent Supreme Court decision
in United States v. Edge Broadcasting[57] removes any doubt that the Commerce Clause extends to
transactions over the Internet. Because the Commerce Clause gives Congress power to legislate
extraterritorially with respect to both gaming and commerce over the Internet, it should be concluded that
Congress has the power to regulate Internet gaming.[58]
C. Extraterritorial Application of Gaming Legislation
{40} United States courts apply a two-part test to determine whether they have subject matter jurisdiction
over acts occurring outside the United States. First, they ask whether there is a congressional intent that the
statute in question should apply extraterritorially. Second, they ask whether the effect of the proscribed
conduct on the United States justifies the exercise of jurisdiction.
(i) Congressional Intent
{41} The reference in the Wire Act to prohibiting "communication in interstate or foreign commerce"
suggests that Congress must have intended that courts have extraterritorial jurisdiction to enforce it. This
view is supported by the decision of the court in Vacco v. World Interactive Gaming.[59] In that case, the
court held that its jurisdiction under the Wire Act "clearly extends to the transmission of betting information
to a foreign country."[60]
{42} In contrast to the Wire Act, the IGPA, in its current form, makes no reference to its possible
jurisdictional reach. Notably, earlier versions of the IGPA expressly stated that "[i]t is the sense of the Senate
that the Federal Government should have extraterritorial jurisdiction over" Internet gaming.[61] This
provision was removed in response to Department of Justice concerns over extraterritorial enforcement.[62]
In the absence of an express statement as to legislative intent, the court will attempt to impute an intention to
Congress and will regard "the purpose of Congress as evinced by the description and nature of the crime."
[63]
{42} The inherently cross-jurisdictional nature of the Internet suggests that Congress must intend the IGPA to
apply to gambling activity occurring in places outside the United States. Arguably, the ease of operating
websites from locations that are far removed from the website's intended audience means that the IGPA
would be virtually meaningless unless there was some potential for it to apply extraterritorially. This issue
was acknowledged by the court in Vacco. That court asserted that not having extraterritorial jurisdiction in
relation to a breach of the Wire Act occurring outside the United States would "severely undermine [New
York's] deep-rooted policy against unauthorized gambling, it also would immunize from liability anyone who
engages in any activity over the Internet which is otherwise illegal."[64]
{43} It is arguable that the removal of an express reference to extraterritorial operation from the IGPA
suggests that Congress did not intend that the IGPA would apply extraterritorially. However, the policy
reasons discussed above, which suggest that the IGPA should apply extraterritorially, outweigh any argument
supporting a Congressional intent that the operation of the Act be restricted to the United States.
(ii) Effects Test
{44} The second prong of the test of whether a court will have subject matter jurisdiction is the effect of the
proscribed conduct on the United States. The court in United States v. Aluminum Company of America
established that United States courts could exercise jurisdiction over proscribed conduct that results in a
demonstrated, actual or presumed effect in the United States.[65]
{45} There are a number of bases on which it is arguable that offshore Internet gaming has an effect on the
United States that is sufficient to justify the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. First, Internet gaming has
the potential to exacerbate social problems associated with gambling. This aspect of Internet gaming has been
the source of much rhetorical excess among anti-gaming advocates. Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ), for example,
classifies Internet gaming as the "crack-cocaine of gambling."[66] Similarly, Keller describes "awestruck
teenage techno-junkies or their gambling-addicted parents pounding the keyboard at unpoliced Internet
gambling sites twenty-four hours a day."[67]
{46} Despite the rhetorical excess, there is no doubt that increased access to Internet gambling may increase
participation in and addiction to gambling and the consequential economic and emotional harm that can stem
from gambling. The costs associated with remedying this harm will be borne, to some extent, by federal and
state governments.
{47} Secondly, online gaming hurts traditional brick-and-mortar gaming businesses. Traditional gaming is a
significant business in some states. A 1996 estimate indicated that $482 billion is spent annually on legalized
gambling in the United States.[68] One analyst indicated that Americans spent 1.2 billion on online gambling
in 1999 and that figure will grow to 3 billion in the year 2001.[69] To the extent that online gaming threatens
the viability of a significant industry that employs large numbers of Americans and generates considerable
profits, such gaming has a significant effect in the United States.
{48} A third, related effect of online gaming is its potential to undermine the tax revenue base of the States.
Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia permit some form of legalized gambling.[70] In People v.
Kim, in which the court was asked to consider whether a purchasing service for out-of-state lottery tickets
violates New York anti-gaming laws, the court noted that the New York State lottery "has become a fund-
raising device of real importance to the state."[71] The same is likely to be true in many states. As people
move from traditional to online gaming, there is likely to be a decrease in taxation revenue generated by
gaming unless technology or regulation makes online tax collection possible.
{49} For the above reasons, there is a strong argument that the effect of offshore Internet gaming is
sufficiently significant to justify its extraterritorial regulation.
(iii) Legality in Another Country
{50} A separate, but related, matter that is relevant to the assertion of subject matter jurisdiction in respect to
Internet gaming laws is that the legality of the activity in another country is irrelevant to a U.S. court's
jurisdiction over that activity. Internet gaming businesses appear to operate under the misapprehension that
legality in one country will act as a shield against prosecution under the laws of another. Cohen's attorney, for
example, argued that because "[i]t is no crime in Antigua to accept a bet," Cohen could not be found guilty of
breaching the Wire Act.[72]
{51} The argument that legality in a country provides a defense to a breach of United States gaming laws was
soundly rejected by the court in Vacco v. World Interactive Gaming.[73] The court found nothing in the
record or the law to support [World Interactive Gaming Corporation's] contentions that federal statutes cannot
apply to an Internet casino licensed by a foreign government.[74] Schwarz, reviewing the relevant gaming
legislation, reached a similar view, asserting that "Congress has clearly chosen to exclude extraterritorial
gambling from breaching our borders, and no foreign governmental licensing agency can, or should, alter
that."[75]
{52} Accordingly, even if the gaming activity is deemed to occur outside the United States, in relation to both
the Wire Act and the IGPA, the test of legislative intent and the effects test are likely to be satisfied. A court
will, therefore, be justified in asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction. Furthermore, legality in another country
will not provide a valid argument against the exercise of that jurisdiction.
IV. PERSONAL JURISDICTION
{53} In addition to establishing subject matter jurisdiction, a United States court will have to determine
whether it has personal jurisdiction over the operators of an offshore Internet casino.[76] Personal jurisdiction
refers to the court's capacity to exercise authority over a defendant. For example, a United States court will
engage in a specific analysis to determine if it has personal jurisdiction over an Australian operator of an
Internet casino licensed in Australia. Under this analysis, the court must be satisfied that this exercise of
personal jurisdiction not only complies with the relevant state's "long-arm" statute, but also satisfies the
requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.[77] The law of personal jurisdiction
in Internet-related matters, however, remains in a state of flux and development. This section of the paper will
address the application of state long-arm statutes and the Due Process Clause to Internet gaming as well as
review the case law relating to the issue of personal jurisdiction in the context of Internet gaming.
A. Long-Arm Statutes
{54} The long-arm statutes of each state set out the jurisdictional limits imposed on that state's courts.
Because the terms of the long-arm statutes of each state vary, the first requirement will not be considered in
detail in this paper. The requirement for some minimum contact between the business and the forum state is
significant, however, because it will apply to both state and, in most cases, federal actions.[78] The
requirement for courts to comply with long-arm statutes is unlikely to severely limit the capacity of United
States regulators to prosecute Australian Internet casinos. Many state long-arm statutes apply very broadly
and allow courts to exercise jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by the Due Process Clause.[79]
{55} Because Internet casinos are likely to transact indiscriminately with people located in the United States,
these casinos could be made a party to an action brought in a number of concurrent jurisdictions.[80] As a
result, prosecutors are likely to choose a jurisdiction with a favorable long-arm statute. Because these
prosecutions are often brought as a result of regulators posing as gamblers, those regulators may choose to
operate from states with favorable long-arm statutes. Accordingly, "forum shopping" by regulatory agencies
is likely to occur.
1. Due Process
{56} In International Shoe Co v. Washington,[81] the Supreme Court established the modern rule for
compliance with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by enunciating "the minimum
contacts test."[82] The Court stated that "due process requires only that . . . if [the defendant] be not present
within the territory of the forum, he must have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'"[83]
{57} In subsequent cases, the Court has expanded upon the minimum contacts test. In World-Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson,[84] the Court found that a corporate defendant must "purposefully avail itself" of the
privileges and benefits of the forum state so that the defendant will have notice that it may be sued in that
forum.[85] A further qualification to the test was made by the Court in Burger King v. Rudzewicz.[86] In that
case, the Court asserted that the exercise of jurisdiction must be fair and reasonable.[87] The Court listed a
number of factors which may be relevant to the fairness and reasonableness of the exercise of jurisdiction and
stated that "[o]nce it has been decided that a defendant purposefully established minimum contacts with the
forum State, these contacts may be considered in light of [those] factors."[88] Accordingly, fairness and
reasonableness will not be decisive factors, but may affect whether or not the defendant's contacts are
sufficient for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction.
{58} The most useful analytical framework in considering the application of traditional jurisdictional
principles to the Internet is provided by the District Court of Pennsylvania in Zippo Manufacturing v. Zippo
Dot Com.[89] In that case, Zippo Manufacturing, a Pennsylvanian corporation, attempted to sue Zippo Dot
Com, a Californian corporation that operated a website called "Zippo Dot Com," for breach of trademark
under Pennsylvania law.[90] Zippo Dot Com's only contacts with Pennsylvania were through the website, but
the court held that it had personal jurisdiction.[91] In making this finding, the court stated that the likelihood
that personal jurisdiction can be exercised "is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of the
commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet."[92] The court then reviewed relevant
precedent, concluding that the ability of a court to gain personal jurisdiction over an entity solely based on
Internet presence can be determined by dividing the entity's use of the Internet into three categories. The first
category comprised "situations where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet."[93] For example,
websites through which people enter into contracts or transmit files fall into this category. The second
category included passive websites which only provide information and do not allow any interaction between
the site and its users.[94] Falling between these two categories is a third category in which users can
exchange information with the website. When websites fall into the third category, the court concluded that
"the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of
the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site."[95] Thus, Zippo established a "'spectrum'
consisting of two polar opposites and a broad middle ground."[96] The analytical framework identified in
Zippo has been relied on heavily in the few cases that have considered Internet gaming.
V. THE INTERNET GAMING CASES
{59} Courts have considered the issue of personal jurisdiction in relation to website operators running
Internet gaming businesses on a number of occasions. Those decisions suggest that courts are likely to
determine that they have personal jurisdiction over an offshore Internet casino that transacts with United
States residents. Considering the three part test in Zippo, this result should not be surprising. The nature of
Internet gaming involves frequent contacts and high levels of interactivity and commercial transacting
between the players and the site. Accordingly, Internet casinos are likely to fall into the category of websites
"where a defendant clearly does business."[97]
{60} The decision of the court in Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc. is significant because it is one of
the few decisions in which jurisdiction has been found based on a passive website.[98] In that case, the
Minnesota Attorney General sued Granite Gate Resorts, a Nevada corporation, for "deceptive trade practices,
false advertising, and consumer fraud."[99] The court in Granite Gate Resorts acknowledged that the case
was the "first in which a Minnesota court [had] addressed the issue of personal jurisdiction based on Internet
advertising,"[100] but expressed its belief that "established legal principles provide adequate guidance."[101]
{61} Granite Gate provided Internet advertising services, which included advertising an online wagering
service called WagerNet. The WagerNet site, which had not commenced operations at the time the action was
brought, had been designed by Granite Gate's president, Kerry Rogers. The site stated that WagerNet was
owned by a company based in Belize and that it provided people with a legal way to bet on sporting events
from anywhere in the world.[102]
{62} The WagerNet site invited people to put themselves on a mailing list to receive more information about
the service. It gave a toll-free telephone number and a Nevada telephone number to call for more information.
Users of the page were advised to consult with local authorities regarding restrictions on offshore sports
betting by telephone before registering with WagerNet and the terms and conditions stated that any claims
against WagerNet could only be brought in Belize.[103]
{63} The court relied on a number of factors to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction. First, it found that
during a two-week period, at least 248 Minnesota computers accessed Granite Gate's website, and that at least
one Minnesota resident was on Granite Gate's mailing list. Second, it found that the quality of Granite Gate's
contacts with Minnesota were significant. In so finding, the court relied on a number of decisions, including
Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc.[104] and Playboy Enterprises v. Chuckleberry Publishing[105] to support the
view that advertising on the Internet is not a passive activity. The court found that "[a]dvertising in the forum
state, or establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum state, indicates a
defendant's intent to serve the market in that state."[106] In support of this conclusion, the court pointed out
that Granite Gate had chosen to use English on the website and had provided a United States toll-free
number. Both of these factors pointed to an intention to target the United States market, including Minnesota.
Thus, the court found that the advertisements should have put Granite Gate on notice that it may be sued in
Minnesota, and thus, that the purposeful availment test was satisfied.[107]
{64} The decision in Granite Gate Resorts has been criticized as setting too low a threshold on the contacts
necessary to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. For example, Felix Pelzer, writing in the South
Carolina Law Review, notes that the rule promulgated in Granite Gate Resorts allows for an interpretation
"that would virtually destroy the traditional requirements for a court's exercise of jurisdiction over a
defendant."[108] It is significant that this extreme interpretation of the law occurred in the context of a
consideration of Internet gaming. In reaching its decision, the court pointed to Minnesota's interest in
regulating gambling as supporting "the exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when viewed in
light of the . . . factors for evaluating whether minimum contacts exist."[109] The decision, therefore,
suggests that policy reasons relating to regulation of gaming may encourage courts to assert jurisdiction over
Internet gaming operators in situations where they may not otherwise do so.
{65} Another interesting point to arise from the decision in Granite Gate Resorts is that the court disregarded
the disclaimer on the WagerNet website. For an Australian Internet casino hoping to limit its exposure to
prosecution under United States gaming laws, the court's approach is significant. The court found that,
although the disclaimer may be relevant to the consumer fraud action brought against Granite Gate, Granite
Gate's "clear effort to reach and seek potential profit from Minnesota consumers provides minimum contacts
of a nature and quality sufficient to support a threshold finding of personal jurisdiction."[110] The court's
decision suggests that a disclaimer will not provide a shield to liability if other elements of the relevant
website satisfy the purposeful availment test.
{66} In Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, the Texas District Court also considered the application of traditional
personal jurisdiction rules to Internet gaming operators.[111] In that case Thompson, a resident of Texas,
brought an action in Texas to recover winnings from Handa-Lopez Inc., a California corporation that operated
an Internet casino called "Funscape's Casino Royale."[112] Players on the Funscape site purchased game
tokens with their credit cards and played casino games using those tokens.[113] The tokens could be
redeemed for either prizes or money.[114] The court noted that "[b]uried within the contract was an
inconspicuous provision which provided that any disputes . . . shall be governed by the laws of the State of
California . . . and shall be resolved exclusively by final and binding arbitration in the City of San Jose,
County of Santa Clara, State of California, USA."[115]
{67} Handa-Lopez sought, among other things, a motion to dismiss the action before the Texas court for lack
of personal jurisdiction.[116] In considering Handa-Lopez's motion to dismiss, the court restated the
traditional jurisdictional principles relating to due process and affirmed the three-category test in Zippo.[117]
Relying on the decisions in Maritz[118] and Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc.,[119] the court held
that Handa-Lopez made sufficient minimum contacts with players on the Funscape site to satisfy the Due
Process Clause.[120]
{68} The court noted that the Funscape site's presence on the Internet meant that it had directed the
advertising of its casino to all states.[121] The court was persuaded by the reasoning in Inset that the Internet
is designed to communicate with thousands of people and that advertisements on it represent a stronger
"contact" with the forum state than traditional advertisements because they "are available continually to any
Internet user."[122] In contrast to Granite Gate Resorts, however, the court, in support of its exercise of
jurisdiction, was also able to rely on the fact that Handa-Lopez "indiscriminately responded to every user"
[123] and "continuously interacted with casino players, entering into contracts with them as they played the
various games."[124] Accordingly, the court was able to identify advertising to Internet users and continuous
and indiscriminate contracting and communication with players as giving rise to the minimum contacts
necessary to establish proper exercise of personal jurisdiction.
{69} The court's reasoning is similar to the reasoning in Granite Gate Resorts in two significant aspects.
First, the court was persuaded by Texas's "strong interest in protecting its citizens by adjudicating disputes
involving the alleged breach of contract, fraud, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act by
an Internet casino on Texas residents."[125] Second, the court found that the clause purporting to be a forum
selection clause did not prevent the filing of a lawsuit outside California and, even if it did, that Thompson
was not given proper notice of the clause.[126] Again, the fact that the subject matter of the action involved
gaming was considered a relevant factor in exercising jurisdiction and the forum selection clause did not
provide grounds upon which to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
{70} The most recent case to consider the issue of personal jurisdiction over Internet gaming operators is
Vacco v. World Interactive Gaming.[127] The central issue addressed by the court was whether the State of
New York could enjoin a foreign corporation that was legally licensed to operate an offshore casino from
offering gambling to Internet users in New York.[128] World Interactive Gaming Corporation was a
Delaware corporation. Its wholly owned subsidiary, Golden Chips Casino Inc., was an Antiguan corporation
that had acquired a license from the government of Antigua to operate an Internet casino.[129] World
Interactive Gaming sought to have the petition for injunctive relief dismissed on the ground that, among other
things, the court lacked jurisdiction over either World Interactive Gaming or Golden Chips Casino.
{71} The court found that Golden Chips Casino promoted its Internet gaming operation on its website, on the
Internet, and in a national gambling magazine.[130] The court also considered the way in which the casino
operated. In this respect, it found that users of Golden Chips Casino were required to wire money to a bank
account in Antigua and to download additional software from Golden Chips Casino's website.[131] In order
to do so, users were required to submit a permanent address.[132] Significantly, if an address in a state that
did not permit gambling, such as New York, was entered, the user was denied access to the site's gambling
facilities.[133]
{72} As with both Granite Gate Resorts and Handa-Lopez, the court commenced its discussion of the
personal jurisdiction issues by reasserting the relevance of traditional jurisdictional issues.[134] In regard to
World Interactive Gaming's contacts with New York, the court found that World Interactive Gaming was
"clearly doing business in New York for purposes of acquiring personal jurisdiction."[135] In reaching this
conclusion, the court relied on, among other things, the fact that World Interactive Gaming operated its
business from its corporate headquarters in Bohemia, New York, worked with a New York graphics company
to design the website and received telephone calls from New Yorkers through its New York headquarters.
[136] Again, the court also found it significant that World Interactive Gaming had engaged in an
indiscriminate advertising campaign all over America with the knowledge that their ads were reaching New
Yorkers.[137]
{73} Having established that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Delaware corporation was
justified, the court then considered whether it could exercise jurisdiction over World Interactive Gaming's
Antiguan subsidiary, Golden Chips Casino.[138] The relevant test to be applied to determine whether to
pierce the corporate veil in this case was whether Golden Chips Casino "was so controlled by [World
Interactive Gaming] as to be a mere agent, department or alter ego" of World Interactive Gaming.[139]
Reviewing the relevant factual circumstances, the court answered the question in the affirmative and found
that exercise of personal jurisdiction over Golden Chips Casino was justified. [140]
{74} To the extent that the exercise of personal jurisdiction was only required to be justified with reference to
Golden Chips Casino's relationship with its parent company, this case does not represent a true exercise of
anti-gaming laws to a foreign entity operating an Internet casino. However, the case does provide a further
example of the fact that the activities normally carried on by Internet casinos will be sufficient to give rise to
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over those casinos.
{75} Another significant element of the case is that the court dismissed Golden Chips Casino's attempt to
prevent users from jurisdictions in which it was illegal to gamble from accessing the site. The court accepted
evidence that "because the software does not verify the user's actual location, a user initially denied access,
could easily circumvent the denial by changing the state entered to that of Nevada, while remaining
physically in the State of New York."[141] No consideration was given to technical limits on the capacity of
the software to accurately ascertain the actual location of the user or the capacity of a user to circumvent such
attempts. The court did pose the question of whether Golden Chips Casino's exclusion of users with addresses
in certain jurisdictions "constitutes a good faith effort not to engage in gambling in New York" but made no
attempt to answer that question or to indicate what might constitute such a good faith attempt.[142] This
aspect of the case should raise significant concerns for licensed Australian Internet casinos which legitimately
attempt to exclude users in jurisdictions that do not permit gambling from accessing their sites. Such attempts
should be relevant to the issue of whether an entity has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing
business in a jurisdiction such that it could expect to be amenable to the courts of that jurisdiction.
{76} As already noted, United States courts may not consider disclaimers relating to the legality of gaming in
each user's jurisdiction to be persuasive in determining whether to exercise personal jurisdiction. In view of
Vacco v. World Interactive Gaming, it appears that imposing technical limitations on access may also not be
sufficient to prevent a court from exercising personal jurisdiction. It is unclear, therefore, what steps an
Internet casino will be required to take to prevent itself from being amenable to the jurisdiction of a United
States court. At some point, however, attempts to exclude users in a particular jurisdiction must demonstrate
that an Internet casino has not availed itself of that jurisdiction.
VI. ENFORCEMENT
{77} With regard to the way courts have applied traditional jurisdictional principles to the Internet, and, in
particular, to cases involving Internet gaming, it can be concluded that United States courts are likely to have
the subject matter and personal jurisdiction necessary to hear actions against operators of offshore Internet
casinos. Accordingly, those operators will be amenable to prosecution for breach of United States anti-
Internet gaming laws such as the Wire Act and, perhaps in the future, the IGPA.
{78} Moreover, United States regulatory bodies have evinced a willingness to pursue convictions and a
commitment to minimizing the effects of offshore Internet gaming on the U.S. Cohen was only one of
twenty-two operators of offshore Internet gaming operations against whom the U.S. Attorney from the
Southern District of New York filed a criminal complaint.[143] Furthermore, former U.S. Attorney General,
Janet Reno, has expressed the official view that "[y]ou can't hide online, and you can't hide offshore."[144]
{79} Significantly, however, regulatory efforts to date have focused on U.S. citizens operating offshore. For
example, Australian operators of licensed Australian Internet casinos can take some comfort from the fact
that United States gaming regulators are unlikely to be able to enforce judgements against them. Unless an
Australian operator of a licensed Australian Internet casino voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the
United States, enforcement of anti-Internet gaming legislation against that operator would require the
Australian Government's cooperation in extraditing that operator. Extradition could be sought on two bases.
First, this could be done under The Treaty on Extradition between Australia and the United States of America,
[145] which, pursuant to the Extradition (United States of America) Regulations (Cth), is enforceable in
Australia under the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth). Second, the United States could attempt to employ the
doctrine of "comity" which refers to "diplomatic niceties performed by countries out of a sense of
international etiquette rather than binding obligation."[146]
{80} Any attempt to affect extradition of the operator of a licensed Australian Internet casino is likely to fail
because of the principle of "double criminality." Double criminality refers to the requirement that the crime in
respect to which extradition is sought is a crime in both countries. In relation to extradition pursuant to a
treaty, the double criminality requirement is expressly stated in the Extradition Act 1988 (Cth).[147] In
relation to extradition under the doctrine of "comity," it is difficult to imagine the Australian Government
agreeing to extradite a person for conducting an activity expressly licensed by it. Accordingly, extradition is
not a realistic enforcement option for United States regulators attempting to prosecute operators of licensed
Australian Internet casinos.
{81} Nevertheless, unenforceability does not prevent United States regulators from issuing warrants for the
arrest of offending operators. In a real sense, such a warrant makes that person a fugitive from the law and
prevents him from traveling to the United States. In countries such as Australia where holders of Internet
gaming licenses are required to pass police checks to ascertain that they are "of good character," the issue of a
warrant may affect their continued ability to hold a license. The simple power to issue warrants should,
therefore, be cause for some trepidation among operators of licensed offshore Internet casinos. Further, to the
extent that any operator of an offshore Internet casino has assets within the United States, those assets may be
liable to seizure.
{82} In addition, United States' regulators may be able to employ a range of indirect enforcement measures
against offshore Internet casinos. The capacity for regulators to prosecute gamblers rather than gambling
businesses or to prevent United States Internet Service Providers or financial institutions from facilitating the
activities of an Internet gambling service may inflict significant financial harm on an Internet gaming
business.[148]
VII. CONCLUSION
{83} The operation of a licensed offshore Internet casino that transacts with U.S. residents is likely to
contravene U.S. anti-gaming laws. In particular, it is likely to contravene the Wire Act and, if enacted, the
IGPA. U.S. courts are likely to be able to exercise jurisdiction over operators of Internet casinos licensed
under the laws of another country for those contraventions. Although U.S. regulators have expressed and
demonstrated a willingness and a commitment to prosecuting operators of offshore Internet casinos, they are
unlikely to be able to enforce judgements against offshore operators unless those operators voluntarily submit
to the jurisdiction of United States courts. For example, as Internet gaming is legal in Australia and is
conducted under government licenses, Australia is unlikely to agree to extradite operators of licensed Internet
casinos to the United States. However, regulators have the capacity to issue warrants against and, in some
circumstances, to seize the assets of operators of licensed offshore Internet casinos, as well as to employ
indirect means of enforcement. Accordingly, an offshore Internet gaming license provides Internet casinos
and their operators with no guarantee of immunity from United States gaming regulators.
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(8) http://www.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/03/crb97003.html GAMBLING IN CALIFORNIA - this article by
Roger Dunstan gives an excellent history of the regulation of gambling in the United States. 
(9) http://www.venable.com/Internet/gaming.html GAMING ON THE INTERNET - This article by Melissa
Landau Steinham discusses the status of gambling on the Web. 
(10) http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/news/sports/html98/gamb_012499.html#background BORDERLESS
BETTING: THE EMERGENCE OF ONLINE GAMBLING - Elliot Almond's article discusses how, even
with the potential safeguards, confusion reigns over what can be done to stop or limit Internet gambling.
(11) http://www.zolatimes.com/v3.11/internet_gambling.htm INTERNET GAMBLING: POPULAR,
INEXORABLE, AND (EVENTUALLY) ILLEGAL - This article, by Tom W. Bell, describes the powerful
demand for Internet gambling, analyzes the forces arrayed against it, and argues against its prohibition.
(12) http://www.iworldinteractive.com/article/new_page_16.htm INTERNET LAWS - This article, by
Kenneth Freeling, gives an overview of recent cases involving the court's treatment of Internet Gambling.
(13) http://www.virtualrecordings.com/wagering.htm WAGERING ON THE WEB - Robin Gross discusses
how the future of online gambling, like many new legal issues raised by the Internet, such as privacy and
jurisdiction, will likely take shape in the courts.
(14) http://www.pcworld.com/resource/article.asp?aid=18091 ONLINE GAMBLING: LUCK RUNS OUT
FOR VIRTUAL CASINOS? - Tom Mainelli's article gives an excellent overview of positions taken by
opponents and proponents of anti-gambling legislation. 
(15) http://study.haifa.ac.il/~bbornfel/Casino/legal.html#56 LEGAL STATUS OF INTERNET GAMBLING -
Article asserts how consumer demand for Internet gambling and the states' demand for tax revenue will create
enormous political pressure for legalization.
(16) http://www.thestandard.net/article/display/0,1151,4387,00.html GABLING ONLINE? YOU BET! - This
article explains when famous names and established companies get involved, opposition to Internet gambling
is appearing to crumble. It includes a table titled Internet Gambling Worldwide, Past and Future which
illustrates the increase in gambling online.
(17) http://asia.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/auspac/03/27/australia.gambling.law/ AUSTRALIA SEEKS
TO BAN CYBER-GAMBLING - This CNN March 27, 2001 article explains how Australia's conservative
government wants to prohibit Internet gambling.
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